

# Offender Programs Report

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## Offender Substance Abuse Report

CORRECTIONS • COURTS • TREATMENT • LAW

*Collaborative Policy Reform*

### Minnesota's Second Chance Coalition Turns Limited Resources Into Opportunity

by Sarah C. Walker

On May 11, 2009, Governor Tim Pawlenty (R-Minnesota) signed into law a public safety omnibus bill, which includes two provisions that address the growing problems of individuals with criminal records finding employment. One provision requires all Minnesota public employers to wait until a job applicant has been selected for an interview before asking about a criminal record or conducting a criminal record check, except in the case of positions that already require a background check.

#### “Ban the Box” Is Now the Law in Minnesota

Passage of this legislation makes Minnesota the first state to adopt a statewide “ban the box” law since All of Us or None of Us, a California-based

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## Say It Three Times and It Must Be Evidence-Based Collaboration: Part Two (The Solution)

by Frank Domurad

While most of us are familiar with the image of Humpty Dumpty as a good old egg, few are aware that he had a much more intriguing career than the authors of nursery rhymes have revealed. Starting in medieval England as the name for a potent concoction of brandy and ale, his name soon became a colloquial term of derision for any person who was fat or obese. But his greatest claim to fame, though it can never be fully substantiated, was as a massive weapon of destruction during the English Civil War.

In 1648 the Parliamentarians, under the leadership of Oliver Cromwell, laid siege to the fortified town of Colchester, held by the Monarchists under King Charles I. The Monarchists in defense of the fortress had mounted a formidable cannon on the tower of the Church of St. Mary's by the Wall. Known affectionately as Humpty Dumpty, because of its enormous size, it wreaked havoc on the attackers, until the Parliamentarians' own guns were finally able to bring both the structure and the offending “obese” weapon tumbling to the ground. Despite multiple attempts, “All the King's horses, and all the King's men, couldn't put Humpty together again.” The battle was

lost, Colchester abandoned, and the Monarchists doomed to defeat in the civil war.

To a great degree, the efforts of correctional professionals to implement evidence-based practices (EBP) resemble those of the ill-fated royalists at Colchester. While much is now known about confronting the “wicked problems” of offender criminal behavior and recidivism, repeated endeavors to translate principle into practice have rarely produced predicted outcomes. The core of the problem, as outlined in part one of this series (Domurad, 2010), lies in practitioners' inability to collaborate both within and outside their own organizations, thereby precluding them from applying available knowledge and solutions to the work that they do. Over and over again, they find themselves engaged in a justice version of Humpty Dumpty, where probation and parole agencies, along with their prosecutorial, defender, and judicial counterparts, focus on their own small piece of the broken criminal justice shell to the detriment of the egg as a whole. In the words of Lisbeth B. Schorr, a renowned

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Harvard University scholar in the field of children and families, the “reason we’re not acting on what we know is that so much of what’s missing and what needs to be done is really hard to do. ... [T]here won’t be a single magic bullet, but a complex array of synergistic interventions that will combine to produce the results we seek” (Schorr, 2008, p. 2).

**Looking Beyond Shortcuts**

Unfortunately, as we now know, the act of individual and organizational collaboration is much more difficult than it seems at first glance. Because the achievement of collaborative advantage is so rare and the experience of collaborative inertia so common in government, practitioners are tempted to look for shortcuts to minimize pain and maximize pleasure in responding to stakeholder calls for immediate change. They seek to transform something complex and difficult into something simple and manageable, and often they are attracted to the siren call of researchers who inadvertently convince them that EBP is mostly about implementing a small handful of reliable and validated programs or practices. To again quote Schorr: “[W]e have become stuck on fixing the isolated pieces that we can get elegant research evidence about.

We privilege programmatic fixes while ignoring the need for more fundamental change.” She concludes that, whether in the case of families and children or offenders and criminal justice, professionals must aggressively move “into the world beyond programs ... because many of the functions that improve outcomes require action across programs, policies, disciplines, and systems” (Schorr, 2008, pp. 6–7).

Many fields outside of government have already taken significant steps toward entering “the world beyond programs.” Charles Heckscher, in his research on multinational corporations in a knowledge-based economy, has focused on the attempts of businesses to deal with the challenges and intricacies of international competition, the private sector’s version of a “wicked problem.” These firms have found that sets of differentiated customer demands can not be met through a traditional, industrialized “one size fits all” approach. Instead, in a rapidly evolving environment, success comes to those who are able to deliver a “solution” to complex problems, a process consisting of close interaction between customers and producers in order to do shared problem-solving for the benefit of all. “A solution by definition brings together resources around customer problems or needs, without regard to where those

resources come from,” writes Heckscher. “Thus it ignores existing organizational lines, histories, business models, and cultures” (Heckscher, 2007, p. 62).

**Learning From Health Care**

A similar situation confronted the field of health care after it was revealed at the turn of the millennium that tens of thousands of patients were dying annually in this nation’s hospitals as a result of medical error. At first, blame was placed solely at the doorstep of the physicians, nurses, and pharmacists working in the facilities. The rationale was that they were the ones purportedly responsible for quality of care, and if mistakes were occurring, they needed to be held more accountable for their actions.

There was a problem with this line of argument, however: Numerous studies quickly revealed that this conclusion was simply not true. While a small handful of health care professionals were indeed personally irresponsible and culpable, the vast majority simply acted within institutional structures that had unrealistic expectations of their knowledge and capabilities and that precluded communication in terms of seeking reasonable solutions to often relatively small problems.

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As a review of the evidence by the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (2001) concluded, “[R]esearchers now believe that most medical errors cannot be prevented by perfecting the technical work of individual doctors, nurses, or pharmacists. Improving patient safety often involves the coordinated efforts of multiple members of the health care team ...” (p. 2). In essence, the wicked problem of unintentional deaths in hospitals could only be resolved in terms of a “novel organizational form based on a network of collaborative relations ... a collaborative community capable of collective learning” (Maccoby, 2006, p. 262).

The need for a comparable collaborative, solutions-based approach to how community corrections undertakes the implementation of EBP can best be illustrated by the list of competencies currently being written into the tasks and standards of probation and parole line staff across the country.

Besides the traditional case management responsibilities of advocacy, assessment, classification, referral, intervention, and evaluation (Enos & Southern, 1996), these officers are now expected to become:

- Experts in the science of criminal behavioral conduct;
- Masters of complicated skills sets ranging from motivational interviewing to core correctional practices;
- Protagonists in therapeutic relationships with clients;
- Interpreters of vast streams of often irrelevant data; and (for good measure)
- Proficients in collateral disciplines such as mental health, substance abuse, and human resources development.

Moreover, it is assumed by those above them that line staff will accomplish these feats primarily on their own, with minimal training, sporadic support from direct supervisors, and in the context of a bureaucratic system that makes communication across unit, divisional, and organizational boundaries difficult, if not impossible.

In such circumstances, it would be nothing short of a miracle if staff members’ interpretation of EBP was frequently not of better things to come, but rather of just another set of responsibilities being piled onto their workload by an uncaring and ill-informed management.

### **Facilitating Practical Knowledge**

The leaders of community corrections and criminal justice agencies cannot deal with the complex challenges posed by EBP until they transform their organizations into collaborative communities that will facilitate, rather than obstruct, the use and application of appropriate, practical knowledge when, where, and how it is most needed.

Just like the private sector and health care, they must move beyond the premise that change is solely an individual responsibility and must recognize the collective premises for success. They must come to see in terms of their own professionals what medicine realized a decade ago: namely, that “the explosion of medical information and technology means that good health care has already largely gone beyond the capabilities of individual physicians and has become a matter of interdependent knowledge work” (Maccoby, 2006, p. 262) and that “coordination and

While knowledge comes in many forms and resides in many places, it is human beings who control its generation and application. They can hoard this knowledge to serve particularistic goals, such as furthering their own careers or the interests of the specific groups to which they belong, or they can share it to serve more collaborative ends, such as the development of solutions to “wicked problems.”

In any organization, knowledge is invariably exploited for a multitude of such purposes, but there is a variance in emphasis depending on how the persons working in the enterprise view their responsibilities. In a bureaucracy, where an individualistic ethic of loyalty and subordination to one’s own functional group and its boss tends to prevail, knowledge is often treated as power. It is shared with others on a “need to know” basis and as a type of barter in an informal exchange of favors required to avoid cumbersome policies and procedures.

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## ***Community corrections and criminal justice agencies cannot deal with the complex challenges posed by EBP until they transform into collaborative communities.***

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communication among specialties, functions, and roles in hospitals plays a very large and generally unrecognized role in health care quality outcomes” (Maccoby, 2006, p. 262).

According to Heckscher and Adler, three institutional pillars form the basis of any collaborative community, whether in the private sector or in government:

1. A shared ethic of interdependent contribution that differs significantly from the bureaucratic ethic of loyalty, subordination, and individuality;
2. A formalized set of process norms that structures and supports interdependent process management; and
3. The development of an interactive and interdependent social character in the workplace so that people can manage, emotionally and psychologically, multiple group affiliations and peer relationships within and across hierarchical chains of command (Heckscher & Adler, 2006, pp. 2–3).

### **Collaborative Knowledge Sharing**

“Collaborative relationships across boundaries, where they emerge, are largely serendipitous rather than based on organizational needs,” write Adler and Heckscher (2006). “That is, someone in production may have a friend in marketing, which might lead to some useful exchanges of information; but this relationship is not generated by the organization itself” (Adler & Heckscher, 2006, pp. 34–35).

By contrast, organizations that strive to share knowledge in a more collaborative fashion in order to achieve “solutions” to difficult collective problems tend to develop what many researchers now call “a shared ethic of interdependent contribution.” Here legitimacy of action does not derive solely from one’s position in the hierarchy. It stems just as much, if not more, from the contribution that a person can make to the group’s purpose and to

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the success of colleagues. The basis for judging the quality of people's work therefore becomes both "doing a good job" in the bureaucratic sense of completing formal tasks and standards and also collaborating with others to further the mission of the organization.

The coin of the realm in this context amounts to a person's reputation, a public determination of how reliable he or she is in collective interaction and how willing he or she is to make information available to colleagues when needed, regardless of the unit or division in which he or she works. Those in power must justify their authority in terms of their contribution to the common purpose, and those who wish to challenge them can do so only on the basis that they know something that the boss does not—something that will "add value" to the ends to be achieved.

those below them can do the same. They are then startled and disappointed to discover that the message they deliver about where the organization is headed has little or no relevance to those managers and staff members who must make the changes happen.

Those at the top do not comprehend that in terms of strategic development and communication, they must move from a position of a "grand vision" to one of "grand vision that can be implemented"—that is, the leader's view of the future is not legitimate unless those who have to carry it out understand it and believe that it makes sense in terms of their own areas of knowledge" (Heckscher & Foote, 2006, p. 494).

Moreover, strategy can assume relevance and legitimacy throughout the chain of command only if formal procedures are in place to manage the interdependent processes within the agency

means training managers and staff about how to think in terms of networks of mutual interdependence and how to link collaborative efforts, wherever they occur, to the mission of the wider organization.

In effect, alongside necessary bureaucratic structures of accountability, there must be institutionalized on an equal plane processes designed to ensure that "parties who see different aspects of a problem can constructively explore their differences and search for solutions that go beyond their own limited vision of what is possible" (Thomson & Perry, 2006, p. 20).

### **Collaborative Leaders**

Among the key elements in making such a cultural transition from dependency to interdependency within an organization are its leaders. Research shows that traditional bureaucratic executives and managers are often consumed with figuring out the most efficient ways to get things done and how to compel people to do them predictably. In correctional organizations, this approach usually translates into a focus on processes such as officers' making offender contacts, maintaining properly completed forms in case files, and entering required data into computer systems.

While these actions might contribute to a regularity of operations and a compliance with existing rules and procedures (something that will definitely make funders and auditors happy), such a course in no way guarantees that the content of what is being done "adds value" to the collective purpose of changing offender behavior and reducing recidivism (something that will satisfy external stakeholders and the public).

In order to achieve this latter set of goals, effective leaders in knowledge-based enterprises must exercise as much influence as they do power with their staff. They must demonstrate a personal commitment to strategy and collective purpose that is as strong as their adherence to position and authority and recognize that no one is exempt from meeting the standard of contribution, including themselves.

Heckscher contends on the basis of his examination of large firms such as IBM and Ford that leaders who believe in and understand the value of collaboration for

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## ***People must be given the opportunity to orient their actions not just to pleasing a boss, but also to activities that "add value" to shared purpose.***

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Thus, what determines weight in any decision-making process is whether one's knowledge and actions either further or hinder the solution of the problem at hand. As James Barksdale, the former CEO of Netscape, once remarked at a meeting of the company, "If the decision is going to be made by the facts, [then] anyone's facts, as long as they are relevant, are equal. If the decision is going to be made on the basis of people's opinions, then mine counts for a lot more" (Pfeffer & Sutton, 2006, p. 31).

The focal point of such an interdependent ethic is the organization's strategy, which Michael Porter (1996) of the Harvard Business School describes as a series of trade-offs: a determination of what an entity will focus on and what it will ignore.

Managers and staff can not contribute to an agency's mission if they do not understand what that mission entails. The problem is that bureaucratic strategies are often developed at the top of the hierarchy, solely by people who are accustomed to thinking in terms of big pictures and mistakenly believe that

required for its effective implementation. The collective coordination of work processes, the second institutional pillar of the collaborative community, can not be left to the sporadic informalities of the bureaucracy. It must be consolidated in terms of integrated "value chains."

People must learn and be given the opportunity to orient their actions not just to pleasing a boss, but also to discussions and activities that "add value" to shared purpose, including the development of strategy itself. They have to be able to work both horizontally, by interacting and sharing knowledge with colleagues outside their narrow hierarchy, and vertically, by being clear about how their actions contribute to a "chain of value" for the organization as a whole.

Creating a chain of value means transforming routine work processes so that space is created for cross-functional and cross-divisional problem-solving teams to arise and dissolve as the need for "solutions" demands and so that performance rewards and sanctions become directly connected to the achievement of more comprehensive strategic themes. It also

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the success of their organizations “do not trumpet it loudly as a program to be followed or put it at the center of their value statements,” but instead “prefer to let it grow from small seeds” (Heckscher, 2007, p. 241). Such leaders are the ones who comprehend and accept their responsibility for nurturing and enforcing an ethic of interdependence and for maintaining the coherence of the strategy in a context of constant “give and take” with their staff.

These leaders understand that without a strategic focus capable of being translated into concrete operational priorities and expectations, practical work guidelines and tools, and process and outcome measures relevant to daily activities, staff members can lose their way, no matter how committed staff might be to visionary goals such as the implementation of EBP. These leaders also instinctively recognize that confusion among staff leads to fear and anxiety, and fear and anxiety open a window of opportunity for those factions that oppose change under any circumstance and wish to sow the seeds of doubt and discord among both internal and external stakeholders.

At the same time, effective collaborative leaders do not assume that resistance is an evil that must be crushed at all costs, for it has its roots, as noted in part one of this series (Domurad, 2010), in a set of deep psychological and emotional needs on the part of those persons comfortable working within bureaucratic settings. In the words of Maccoby and Heckscher (2006):

[T]he fact remains that almost all organizations moving toward collaborative community have great difficulty in overcoming patterns of bureaucratic deference and control. “Leaders need to act not purely as transformational visionaries, operational executors, bridge builders, and team organizers; they must also act to satisfy continuing needs for authoritative protection and direction” (Maccoby & Heckscher, 2006, p. 477).

### **Creating a New Professional Model**

This recognition of the emotional aspects of organizational change leads to the third institutional pillar of a

collaborative community: namely, the development of an interactive and interdependent social character in the workplace, what might be called the creation of a new professional role model. Many scholars have emphasized that people who depend on authority and seek the security and clarity of bureaucratically defined jobs often have trouble functioning in collaborative systems. Such people tend to define competence in terms of doing well in a position rather than contributing to a collective good. For them, “adding value” equates more to meeting tasks and standards than determining how

- Had a sense of ownership in the plan;
- Understood its concrete application to their own behavior;
- Agreed to its expectations and consequences on a “voluntary basis”; and
- Felt that they had participated in an interactive, “fair” process for its development, where their side of the story had been sincerely heard.

As Taxman and Thanner (2003/2004) summarized, “[P]reliminary findings confirm that when the offender perceives the justice and treatment system as fair, compliance increases” (pp. 40, 61).

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## *Effective collaborative leaders do not assume that resistance is an evil that must be crushed at all costs.*

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their actions affect others and the organization’s strategic purpose. As a result, they frequently lack two vital elements that constitute an “interdependent” sense of self: specifically, the habits of caring and heedfulness.

In a recent article on the relationship between probation and the therapeutic perspective, Taxman and Thanner (2003/2004) described a microcosmic version of such an interactive personality at work in one agency in the way that officers managed their cases with offenders. Starting from the assumption that the traditional dichotomy of social roles in the profession between law enforcer and social worker must be superseded by the notion of “behaviour management specialist charged with assisting the offender in facilitating a change process,” Taxman and Thanner (2003/2004, p. 20) outlined an interpersonal relationship between professional and client that amounted to the establishment of a miniature collaborative community. They explained that the way an officer approached the execution and monitoring of court orders would either positively or negatively affect the chances of an offender’s complying with the probation sentence and the requirement for treatment participation. Similar to the process of establishing strategic legitimacy on an organizational level, behavioral contracts between officer and offender were more likely to be accepted by offenders if they:

In fact, the existence of an identifiable, reliable, and fair process for doing business in an organization, at all levels of operation, is a precondition for engaging in any knowledge-based change process such as EBP. Adler and Heckscher (2006) emphasize in a review of the research that hierarchical authority and collaborative community are not mutually exclusive and must ultimately fit together for progress to occur. They contend, “Whenever a group is focused on shared instrumental activity ... effective authority is essential to success—to define direction, allocate resources, and to resolve disputes” (Adler & Heckscher, 2006, pp. 59–60). Adler and Heckscher (2006) add, “Without it communal groups inevitably fall victim to faction and to inefficiencies resulting from the inability to make decisions that involve conflict among members” (pp. 59–60). Thus, the trick is not to reject bureaucracy, thereby alienating those persons in the organization who cherish its reliability and security, but to transform it into a structure that complements “communal definitions of legitimacy” and corresponds with an ethic of interdependent contribution (Adler & Heckscher, 2006, pp. 59–60).

The research of Adler and Borys on workflow formalization in organizations discovered that bureaucracy comes in “coercive” and “enabling”

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versions. *Coercive bureaucracy* begins with the assumption that organizations must extract effort and compliance from employees. Rules and procedures must substitute for employee commitment, and mechanisms of tight control must be instituted to prevent slacking and shiftlessness. Any deviation from operational standards and hierarchical routine, such as pursuing interdependent collaboration across units or divisions, is suspect. The

into something that is considered “good.” Second, enabling rules reduce the conflict between bureaucratic and collaborative forms of operation.

Given that the bulk of the average person’s work day occurs as formal and informal routine, if that routine creates efficiency in a fashion that respects and incorporates innovation and learning, it is a much shorter step for everyone to take to develop and accept the interactive and interdependent processes essential for dealing with the complex uncertainty of criminality on the basis of collective

from autonomy to interdependence; from deference to dialogue; and most central of all, from a primary focus on doing a job well to a focus on contribution to collective purposes” (Heckscher, 2007, pp. 108–109, 128).

Solansky and Beck (2009) transfer these cognitive principles to the field of criminal justice in their research on cyberterrorism. They argue that for interagency collaboration to occur in situations involving terrorism, “managers should promote a collective mind within their respective agencies so that emergency responders recognize appropriate actions and are willing to put aside single agency initiatives in favor of community-wide actions when necessary.” They must learn within their own organizations to “reward careful and attentive actions, provide agency members with critical information of others’ skills and abilities so that efforts are combined in an intelligent manner, and explicitly demonstrate how each agency function is connected and dependent on each other” (Solansky & Beck, 2009, p. 871).

For Solansky and Beck (2009), it is only when public safety officials take responsibility for first putting their own cognitive houses in order that they will be able effectively to combine the inter-organizational knowledge and resources necessary for mastering the “wicked” problem of cyberterrorism (Solansky & Beck, 2009, p. 871).

### **The Social Principle**

Indeed, heedful action and collective mindsets can not arise outside a framework of social trust. As Heckscher and Foote (2006) emphasize, it is very difficult for any individual or organization to change behavior without the belief that the surrounding others will do likewise. “Those who offer to share resources, if they are dealing with people who still want to control, will find that they have given without getting anything back; and the system will quickly fall back into the old web of expectations based on autonomy,” Heckscher and Foote (2006) observe (pp. 495–496).

Virtually every scholar in the field agrees with this conclusion. Trust is the grease that lubricates the wheel of

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## ***An enabling bureaucracy designs rules to support and assist staff in mastering their tasks through the interactive development of solutions to problems.***

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system as a whole is strategically transparent only to a few at the top, so that workers are not tempted to make or suggest alterations that might have damaging consequences for the instituted order.

In contrast, an *enabling bureaucracy* designs rules to support and assist staff in mastering their tasks through the interactive development of solutions to problems. It codifies best practices in order to stabilize and diffuse new capabilities so that staff may do their jobs better and meet customer or client needs more fully. It presents a transparent, mental model of the functioning of the organization. In this way, employees can understand the organization’s inner logic and external fit with the environment, deal more effectively with contingencies, and identify local and systemic opportunities for improvement (Adler & Borys, 1996).

By adopting an enabling model of bureaucracy, community correctional agencies can lay an important foundation for meeting the strategic needs inherent in the implementation of complicated changes, such as those required by EBP, in two ways. First, by seeking to enhance rather than destroy the culture and operation of bureaucracy, agencies limit resistance and the scope of structural revision that must occur initially. They are not asking those who develop and live by the rules to abandon the rules, but to transform them from what is universally seen as “bad”

knowledge rather than individual bias (Domurad, 2003). In short, one must construct an institutional environment where the bureaucratically inclined can see their way forward toward acting as the collaboratively committed.

To create this personal pathway to a collaborative community, whether within a division, an organization, or a systemic network of organizations, two other steps are essential for putting the scattered pieces of the Humpty Dumpty of Evidence-Based Practices back together again. One is cognitive and the other social in nature.

### **The Cognitive Principle**

The cognitive principle, as previously discussed in part one of this series (Domurad, 2010), relates to the concepts of heedful action and collective mind. Charles Heckscher (2007) contends that organizations can not marshal and exploit knowledge to solve complex problems without first addressing the cognitive aspects of their existing hierarchical cultures. He defines culture as a collective “mindset” consisting of diffusely patterned expectations that allow us to “act in ways that seem *sensible* to us even when we can not predict exactly what that will be.” For him, the transition from a bureaucratic to a collaborative entity can not occur without “a change that requires certain fundamental and difficult transformations of collective mindsets:

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collaboration, for without it the promise of collaborative advantage cannot be realized and the risk of collaborative inertia can not be endured. As Adler (2001) succinctly states, “[E]ffective development of knowledge ... depends on employee commitment and on collaborative teamwork for which mutual trust is a critical precondition” (p. 220).

The problem is that there is no social silver bullet for creating trust among actors, just as there is no programmatic silver bullet for modifying offender behavior. Trust can only arise incrementally in an iterative process of trial and error where each positive outcome, no matter how small, moves everyone toward what Vangen & Huxham (2003) call a “virtuous circle” of success (p. 8). In part, trust emerges from the collective act of constructing the collaborative community itself. When individual performance is measured as a contribution to organizational purpose in terms of an ethic of interdependency, when each manager and staff member is clear about how he or she adds value to a common strategy, when heedful actions are rewarded and heedless actions are sanctioned, and when bureaucracy is assumed to enable rather than coerce employee commitment, then people will begin to see that what now “makes sense” in cultural terms is not the preservation of one’s own “turf.” Rather it is the sharing and transfer of knowledge across functional and structural boundaries in order to find solutions to the problems that afflict one and all.

Nonetheless, this budding “virtuous circle” of trust will not survive in a hierarchical organization until one last piece of the puzzle falls into place. In a recent article in the *Harvard Business Review*, two of the nation’s foremost experts on business ethics and leadership, James O’Toole and Warren Bennis (2009), stated bluntly, “We won’t be able to rebuild trust in institutions until leaders learn how to communicate honestly—and create organizations where that’s the norm” (p. 58). They contended that “companies cannot innovate, respond to changing stakeholder needs, or function efficiently unless people have access to relevant, timely, and valid information,” and that the leader’s

job was to make this happen by creating operational transparency in terms of “systems and norms that lead to a culture of candor” (p. 58). They advised

how it had made great strides forward on the basis of specialization. After listening attentively, one scientist raised his hand and queried, “Your technology is

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leaders who understood the relationship between trust and success to take the following steps:

1. *Tell the truth.* “Leaders who are candid and predictable ... signal to followers that the rules of the game aren’t changing and that decisions won’t be made arbitrarily.”
2. *Encourage people to speak truth to power.* “What [leaders] fail to understand is that trust is a symbiotic relationship: Leaders must first trust others before others will trust them.”
3. *Reward contrarians.* “Companies with healthy cultures continually challenge their assumptions.”
4. *Admit mistakes.* “Wise leaders do this.”
5. *Set information free.* “Corporate managers tend to keep a great deal of information private that could easily—and usefully—be shared widely” (O’Toole & Bennis, 2009, pp. 60–61).

In effect, O’Toole and Bennis (2009) were confirming a very simple fact about trust and collaboration: The practice of heedful action embedded in an ethic of interdependent contribution to purpose can survive only in an organization or a system of organizations when, and only when, it is accepted and modeled by those persons who are in charge, the ones who stand at the very top of the hierarchical pyramid.

### **Repairing Humpty Dumpty**

In the early days of the space program in the United States, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) gave a tour of its facilities to a group of Asian scientists, who were significantly impressed by what they saw. As part of the tour, they received a lecture on the benefits of Western science and

excellent at taking the world apart; what is your plan for putting it back together again?”

So it is with the Humpty Dumpty of Evidence-Based Practices in community corrections and criminal justice. All along the base of the wall, where Humpty once jovially sat in peace and tranquility, lie pieces of broken shell. Each of them has a name: It might be a functional specialization such as assessment, supervision, treatment, contracting, procurement, budgeting, or evaluation; or it might be a discrete organization such as probation, prosecution, judiciary, defender, or community group. Whatever the respective names are, however, none of them individually amounts to a solution for “wicked problems” such as crime, recidivism, and reentry without some plan for putting them all back together again.

That plan too has a name. It is simply called evidence-based collaboration.

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